Worth a Look: Contractors in Stability Operations
Stability Operations for Dummies: The Role of the Prvate Sector in Iraq (YouTube Briefing)
Doug Brooks, founding President of the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) has a video circulating that offers the soft sales pitch for outsourcing “contingency support.” It is all positive and completely avoids all of the negatives, such as:
1. Pillaging and disrupting existing intelligence and special operations ranks by incentivizing early retirement.
2. Cost 3x to 10X that of a uniformed or civil service source.
3. Profit motive rather than mission motive.
4. Pretends contractor mistakes are not politically accountable.
5. Pretends contractors actually favor low-cost locals (which radically reduces overhead profits)
6. Pretends contractors actually fit exactly the right person to the job rather than being a body mover
7. Completely avoids the massive failure of contractors in both Iraq and Afghanistan–they are part of the PROBLEM, not part of the solution because their existence–and the policymaker’s ignorant choice of contractors–undermines both Whole of Government and Multinational Multifunctional operations.
Phi Beta Iota: Until the US Government masters strategic thinking, re-learns how to do multinational engagement, and re-learns how to write Statements of Work (SOW) with coherent metrics for evaluating performance–AND absolutely forbids contractors from recruiting government employees still in active service, this is not going to get fixed. It merits comment that a great deal of crime accompanies contractor engagements in war zones, and both drug smuggling and illicit arms sales seems to be a very profitable fringe activity once contractors are invited into a war zone.
For alternative non-fiction perspectives:
Review: The Shock Doctrine–The Rise of Disaster Capitalism
Review: First Do No Harm–Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia
Review: Deliver Us from Evil–Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict
Review: Confessions of an Economic Hit Man
Journal: Outsourcing Honor, Losing Common Sense
Review: Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spectacle
Journal: Somalia, Special Operations, and Soft Power Not Present
Review: Blood Money–Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq
Review: Bad Money–Reckless Finance, Failed Politics, and the Global Crisis of American Capitalism
Review: The Three Trillion Dollar War–The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict
Review: Licensed to Kill–Hired Guns in the War on Terror (Hardcover)
Review: Dead Aid–Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa
Review: Bad Samaritans–The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism
Review: Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series) (Hardcover)
Review: A Half Penny on the Federal Dollar–The Future of Development Aid
Review: Fixing Failed States–A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World
Review: The Bottom Billion–Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It
See also Review menu, especially Capitalism (Good & Bad) (125); Iraq (33); Peace, Poverty, & Middle Class (103); and Stabilization & Reconstruction (29)
Thanks for the insights, and happy to be able to respond.
1. A GAO report proved that the industry was too small to have a detectable impact on numbers of SF personnel. Happy to provide a reference (on all these questions) if you contact me directly. The numbers are just too small, and most personnel long retired before they go to the private sector.
2. Most contractors are local nationals earning 1/50th of what Westerners earn, even Western soldiers. And it is locals who should be doing the security and reconstruction in their own countries anyway.
3. Typical Western perspective – either/or. In fact the reality is of course far more nuanced. It is correct to say that most contractors would not do the jobs unless they are compensated for the risk, time away from the family etc., but to imply they don’t care about the mission is an obvious oversimplification.
4. Dunno what that means. Any part of a contingency operation has political implications.
5. Of course they do. I did my initial research in the field in the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, but the reality holds in Iraq and Afghanistan as well. See my article in the recent Journal of International Peace Operations. PeaceOps dot com
6. If companies expect to retain contracts they sure do their best.
7. Prof. Steve Schooner at GWU made a comment during Allison Stanger’s recent talk there – that someone needs to compare the logistic support of Gulf I with Gulf II – there is no comparison. The support is enormously more effective using contractors.
Happy to discuss this in greater depth if you’d like to contact me at IPOA (most Naomi Klein fans prefer not to debate people with other perspectives, so it’d be a pleasant surprise if you do contact me).
Best regards,
Doug Brooks, IPOA
Sure, I’d be glad to talk to you, as soon as you read and review all of the alternative perspectives listed in the piece to which you responding.
Great! Looking forward to hearing from you and a productive discussion.
-doug
Mr. Steele, are you having problems finding my contact information?
Mr. Brooks, no offense was intended. My email address is spelled out in the About section. I have looked up your email and will respond directly. Robert Steele