Reference: Fixing Intel–A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan

Categories: 08 Wild Cards,DoD,Ethics,Government,Military,Monographs,Peace Intelligence

UPDATE: A colleague from within asked us to highlight this quote with the observation that neither the US IC nor DoD have any clue how to execute. We agree. Both lack leadership with vision and multinational panache; they simply do not know what they do not know because they have both wasted the last 21 years refusing to listen or learn.

P.23. They must embrace open-source, population-centric information as the lifeblood of their analytical work. They must open their doors to anyone who is willing to exchange information, including Afghans and NGOs as well as the U.S. military and its allies. As General Martin E. Dempsey, commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, recently stated, “…[T]he best information, the most important intelligence, and the context that provides the best understanding come from the bottom up, not from the top down.”

The Cold War notion that open-source information is “second class” is a dangerous, outmoded cliché. Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, former director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, captured it perfectly: “Ninety percent of intelligence comes from open sources. The other 10 percent, the clandestine work, is just the more dramatic.

28 Pages Online

News Story with Links: Spies Like Us: Top U.S. Intel Officer Says Spooks Could Learn From Journos

USMC WM in AF

Good News: Some good people in the field have finally re-invented half the wheel–the company-level bottom-up half. Unfortunately they have absolutely no idea what can be gotten from the rest of the world (non US citizens without clearances); they are jammed into a legacy system that demands at least a SECRET clearance; there is no Multinational Engagement Network that is totally open albeit commercially encrypted, and therefore this is going nowhere. We could fix this on leftover loose-change, but ONLY if DoD intel leadership will accept the iconoclastic multinational solutions that have been in gestation for 21 years.

Bad News: CIA and DIA are still broken and not likely to get fixed anytime soon. The Human Terrain Teams (HTT) are an utter disgrace. DoD commanders still have not figured out Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) and OSINT does not appear in this report, nor does Reach-Back, 24/7 tribally-nuanced on demand web-cam translator services, and on and on and on. Army G-2 is non-existent–Army is simply not trained, equipped, nor organized to do tactical intelligence in small wars. Neither is the Marine Corps, but they adapt better. What is so very tragic is that this is a problem that can be fixed FAST with Multinational Engagement and a proper use of distributed linguistic and cultural assets. All it needs is an internationalist mind-set, which no one now serving in DIA or CIA actually can muster. All of the pathologies we have been writing about since 1988 are to be found in Afghanistan, and none of the solutions that many, many authors have written about for the last 21 years are even on the table.

3 Responses to “Reference: Fixing Intel–A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan”

Retired Reader says:

2010/01/05 at 19:51

Actually the astonishing thing is the complete of corporate memory on the part of the U.S. Army. The Army had division level tactical intelligence companies equipped, but not staffed prior to its full involvement in the Vietnam War. As that war moved forward tactical intelligence operations improved dramatically and such innovative vehicles as the tactical report (TACREP) was widely used whereby timely intelligence was sanitized and immediately disseminated down to the company level warning of impending mortar attacks, ambushes, and force locations. Order of battle information was also routinely provided to tactical units in a no fuss manner. Once company and field grade officers recognized that they were receiving accurate tactical intelligence, they didn’t care where it came from or how it was processed. It saved lives and that is all they cared about. Yet the Vietnam War, particularly in its first four years was primarily a counter-insurgency operation. The tactical intelligence units operated in small, mobile teams deployed with the combat troops and yes they suffered casualties. I don’t think the Army operates that way any more.
Journal: Iran, Sacred Nukes, & US Ignorance « Public Intelligence Blog says:

2010/01/09 at 14:23

[...] Phi Beta Iota: We featured Scott Atran earlier. This is the kind of deep knowledge that simply does not get presented, much less understood, within the secret intelligence world, even less so among “deciders” who decide things without relevant intelligence (decision) support. This is the strategic equivalent of General Flynn’s focus on fixing intelligence in Afghanistan. [...]
Reference: COIN Dynamic Planning, Full Text Found « Public Intelligence Blog says:

2010/01/12 at 19:37

[...] neighborhood level of granularity such as Dr. Stephen Cambone knew in 2000 we would need. This is why General Flynn says intelligence is not helping in Afghanistan. 95% of what we need to know to support this planning and operational campaign management model [...]

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