Seriously. NATO Transformation Command, based in Norfolk, Virginia and previously known as Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, wants to crowd-source the future. They have a strategic foresight initiative that is hot right now, and anyone can sign up to have an account and express their views on Economics, Environment, Technology, and more. These are serious people with good intentions. Got brain? Take it for a drive at the Innovation Hub. Right now. This stage CLOSES on 23 June. Contributors get to join in the video discussion 24-26 June 2015. The possibility of personal thank you letters is being discussed. Do this. Now. Please. http://innovationhub-act.org/
My preliminary contributions to the NATO Strategic Foresight Online Workshop. I have no appointment or connection to NATO or the Transformation Command. This workshop is open to the public without restriction.
Characteristics of the Future Threats & Possibilities
Human Considerations I & II
Strategic Foresight I & II
The below newly-acquired Congressional Research Service (CRS) have been received from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and are now catalogued and accessible here.
Sigh. I was not going to comment on David Patraeus gross dereliction of duty but several colleagues are totally pissed off and they are correct to be angry. Here are a mix of supposition and fact along with my conclusions on this sorry disgrace to the Republic. HOWEVER, I conclude this is not about Patraeus — many others should be indicted along with him and many others have committed high crimes and misdemeanors that exhonerate him in relative terms.
UPDATED to integrate specific observations from IDENS A-C.
UPDATED to add key paragraphs from Marcy Wheeler at SALON and Ray McGovern.
Short URL: http://tinyurl.com/Patraeus-Mossad
Peter Mattis, The National Interest
The flaws in this intelligence-reform mentality are four-fold—and each plays a role in how proposals like Brennan’s reported reforms are generated and discussed, as well as past reforms such as creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. First, many intelligence-reform proponents conflate the very different disciplines of what we normally think of as intelligence and security intelligence, which includes activities like counterterrorism. Second, the problems with the CIA and the U.S. Intelligence Community are organizational. Third, security stovepipes no longer reflect modern intelligence concerns. Finally, they assume U.S. intelligence agencies are basically the same, making centralization and reducing duplication effective means of improving intelligence performance.