2014 The National Intelligence Strategy of the USA — 3 Strikes and Out

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(U) 2014 US National Intelligence Strategy

STRIKE ONE: Refuses counterintelligence on domestic enemies.

STRIKE TWO: Refuses Whole of Government.

STRIKE THREE: Refuses Acquisition.

The six sucking chest wounds identified in 1990 continue. HUMINT/CI are dead in the water, followed by OSINT and mature holistic analytics integrating true cost economics. We continue to process 1% of what we collect by technical means, while being so far removed from human-centric ground truth about everything as to cause one to wonder, just who is the US IC supposed to be helping?

Keep the money moving, rah rah rah.

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Click on Image to Enlarge

See Especially:

1989 Al Gray (US) on Global Intelligence Challenges

1990 Intelligence in the 1990′s – Six Challenges

See Also:

1989+ Intelligence Reform

1976+ Intelligence Models 2.1

1957+ Decision Support Story

Books By and With Robert Steele (includes Amazon links and free online links)

Worth a Look: Book Reviews on Intelligence (Most)


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Sep 20

Patrick Cockburn: Letter from Arabia — ISIS is the Lesser of All Evils — And Most Certainly Less Evil Than an Invading Occupying USA…

Patrick Cockburn

Patrick Cockburn

The Impossible War

Isis cannot be beaten as long as there is civil war in Syria


CounterPunch • SEPTEMBER 11, 2014

A letter printed at the bottom of this article was emailed by a friend soon after her neighbourhood in Mosul was hit by Iraqi airforce bombers. This was some hours before President Barack Obama explained his plan to weaken and ultimately destroy Isis, which calls itself Islamic State, by a series of measures including air attacks. The letter illustrates graphically one of the most important reasons why American air power may be less effective than many imagine.

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Sep 15

Steven Aftergood: US Intelligence Budget Data — PBI: Understated but on the Record

Steven Aftergood

Steven Aftergood

Intelligence Budget Data

On March 4, 2014, the Administration submitted its Fiscal Year 2015 budget request, including a base funding request of $45.6 billion for the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and a base funding request of $13.3 billion for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). On June 30, the DNI submitted an updated FY2015 budget request of $49.4 billion for the NIP including funding for overseas contingency operations. An updated budget request figure for the MIP has not yet been disclosed.

Phi Beta Iota: We consider these figures to be severely deceptive and roughly 70% of the actual combined total budget for green and black intelligence capabilities that are secret, toxic, and a mix of benignly worthless (standing armies of ignorant analysts, collection that is not processed) and pathologically dangerous (drones, renditions, covert operations, subsidies to foreign intelligence services). Our best guess of the actual total US secret intelligence budget remains US$100 billion per year, inclusive of thousands of private sector “intelligence” capabilities (many of them “open source” and extremely mediocre) that are embedded within acquisition and other contracts, all out of control and of dubious value.

IC Budget Table Cropped

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Click to access Office of the Director of National Intelligence Budget Justifications

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Sep 11

Edward Snowden with Jim Bamford in WIRED: Next NSA Revelations “Would Be the Death of All of Them Politically”

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The most wanted man in the world

Jim Bamford

WIRED, 13 August 2014


“It’s like the boiling frog,” Snowden tells me. “You get exposed to a little bit of evil, a little bit of rule-breaking, a little bit of dishonesty, a little bit of deceptiveness, a little bit of disservice to the public interest, and you can brush it off, you can come to justify it. But if you do that, it creates a slippery slope that just increases over time, and by the time you’ve been in 15 years, 20 years, 25 years, you’ve seen it all and it doesn’t shock you. And so you see it as normal. And that’s the problem, that’s what the Clapper event was all about. He saw deceiving the American people as what he does, as his job, as something completely ordinary. And he was right that he wouldn’t be punished for it, because he was revealed as having lied under oath and he didn’t even get a slap on the wrist for it. It says a lot about the system and a lot about our leaders.”

Read full article with many new revelations.

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Aug 13

2014 Robert Steele On Defense Intelligence – Seven Strikes

Robert Steele

Robert Steele

On Defense Intelligence: Seven Strikes

Why Secretary of Defense Hagel Must Choose the Next Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency


CounterPunch, 2 July 2014

As the Department of Defense (DoD) prepares to change who manages the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the services are vying to place their candidate without regard to the fundamentals of the position. I thought it would be useful to examine seven areas where the next Director of DIA could make a difference, provided he or she has the explicit support of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) – otherwise these are seven strikes and that person is “out” before they begin.

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Jul 2

2014 Robert Steele Open Letter to Vice President of the United States of America Joe Biden, The White House

Robert David STEELE Vivas

Robert David STEELE Vivas

SHORT URL: http://tinyurl.com/OSA-Biden

These materials were delivered via certified mail to the Office of the Vice President on Monday 5 May 2014.

There is a better than even chance that the IC “minder” controlling the Vice President’s correspondence intercepted the package and the Vice President is therefore unwitting of this official certified as delivered communication.

1 May 2014 Letter to VP
Biden Six Slides
Open Source Agency Synopsis 2014
2014 Smart Nation Act (Simplified)
USPS Shipment Info for 9502600036814121000268

ADDENDUM: The OSA will be the premier decision-support organization in the world, promulgating the proven process of decision-support (requirements definition, collection management, source discovery and validation, multi-source fusion, geospatially-rooted processing, inter-disciplinary analysis, and open transparent action-enabling production). The OSA will also be the only USG element that provides Congress and the Executive with identical decision-support also shared with the public, and the only USG element that is “all in” on M4IS2/OSE. For those that have asked about personnel, tables of organization, budgets, etcetera — at this level of play, decisions are made on one line and a number. OMB has set the numbers — $125M IOC toward $2-3B FOC. My personal view is that the organization should consist of no more than  120 full-time personnel within the HQ element on the South-Central Campus. Spending will be focused on individual minds in every clime and place, and on incentivizing coalitions among the eight tribes across all boundaries. The School of Future-Oriented Hybrid Governance, the World Brain Institute, and the EarthGame will be independent subsidized elements manned by rotational personnel on sabatical — gatherings of eagles from across all nations, agencies, disciplines, and domains.

M4IS2: Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making

OSE: Open Source Everything — the only affordable, inter-operable, scalable, and therefore sustainable global approach to engineering

Full Text Below the Fold — Use Translate Box to Read in Other Languages

全文下方折 – 使用转换盒来阅读其他语言
Texte intégral en dessous du pli - Utiliser Traduire Boîte à lire dans d’autres langues
Полный текст ниже раза - Использование Перевести Box читать на других языках
पूर्ण पाठ तह के नीचे - उपयोग अन्य भाषाओं में पढ़ने के लिए बॉक्स अनुवाद
Texto completo abaixo da dobra - Utilize Caja Traduzir para ler em outros idiomas
Teks Penuh Di bawah Lipat - Gunakan Terjemah Box untuk Baca dalam Bahasa Lain
Texto completo debajo de la tapa - Utilizar Caja de Traducion para leer en otros idiomas Volledige tekst onder de vouw - Inzetten Vertalen Box te lezen in andere talen

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May 17

Mini-Me: US Intelligence Community’s Kodak Moment — IMPLOSION — Comment by Robert Steele

Who?  Mini-Me?

Who? Mini-Me?


The U.S. Intelligence Community’s Kodak Moment

The game is changing rapidly. Can Washington’s intelligence community keep up?

Josh Kerbel

National Interest, 15 May 2014

Josh Kerbel is the Chief Analytic Methodologist at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He writes often and openly on the intersection of government (especially intelligence) and globalization. The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not imply endorsement by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or the US Government.

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Click on Image to Enlarge

In 2012, the once-mighty Eastman-Kodak company declared bankruptcy. It was an event that should have reverberated strongly with the United States Intelligence Community (IC)—and not just due to the obvious connection between imaging and spying. Rather, it should have resonated because in Kodak the IC could have glimpsed a reflection of itself: an organization so captivated by its past that it was too slow in changing along with its environment.

To understand the IC’s similar captivation and lethargy—to remain focused on classified collection in an era of increasingly ubiquitous, useful and unclassified data—one must first understand the type of problem around which the modern IC business model remains designed: the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was fundamentally a collection problem. That is to say, it was a closed system (i.e., a discrete entity) with clear edges and a hierarchical governance structure. Given that nature, knowing what was happening in the Soviet Union required the use of classified means of collection—most of which the IC alone possessed.

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May 15

Berto Jongman: US Intelligence Community Needs a New Workforce Model

Berto Jongman

Berto Jongman

The Intelligence Community Needs a New Workforce Model

It’s a new world for the 17 agencies within the intelligence community. Their budgets are shrinking in the face of an undiminished threat landscape and a growing list of cyber-adversaries.

The IC can do a lot of things, but it can’t make money grow on trees. It faces a grand workforce challenge: Smaller budgets. Reduced hiring. Increased uncertainty. The problems are magnified significantly during national security events that require a surge of talent.

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With all that in mind, the Intelligence and National Security Alliance developed a task force of former senior intelligence officials and stakeholders from industry and academia to explore potential solutions. The resulting white paper released May 7,  titled “Smart Change II: Preparing the Intelligence Community Workforce for an Evolving Threat and Fiscal Environment,” is a sequel to an initial INSA-led effort in 2011.

The white paper outlines several ways the IC could ensure a continuous assessment of strategic risk related to workforce reductions and proposes an overarching framework for civilian, military and contractor components of the IC that would guide strategic planning and management decisions.

“Budget constraints are the reality now,” said Deborah Kircher, Chief Human Capital Officer for the Office of the National Director of Intelligence, speaking at a Strategic Manpower Planning event hosted by Nextgov.

Read rest of article.


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May 10

GEOINT State of the World

Below is the GEOINT State of the World* as of 1990. With excellent intentions — and major advances in technology, third-party collection, and commercial methods — NGA’s Map of the World has advanced tangibly and is to be praised. In that context, it would be useful to have an authoritative appraisal of precisely where we are today, in 2014, with respect to 1:50,000 combat charts, with contour lines and current cultural features, country by country, and with respect to 1:20:000 combat charts, city by city, port by port. This should include a deliberate recognition of many instances where GPS data and hand-held terminals are sufficient, along with a measured commitment to ensure that the infantry — 4% of the force, 80% of the casualties, 1% of the budget — is provided for in all the other instances where only a real map will do.

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Apr 25

SchwartzReport: NSA as Foundation for Police State with Comment on “Parallel Construction”

Stephan A. Schwartz

Stephan A. Schwartz

Here are the views of a former high ranking NSA official. They remind me of Richard Clarke.

Just because authority at this point only intrudes to a small degree does not mean it cannot go much further. The information will be there to work with. And there are thousands of laws.

I am always concerned I may seem alarmist about a trend but, really I’m just reporting the data, the emerging information. President Obama’s comment today that this network of agencies is made up of our neighbors is patently disingenuous.

Click through to see the actual powerpoint slides that document this piece.

Former Top NSA Official: ‘We Are Now In A Police State”

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Jan 18