Reference: 2010 Global Foresight Commons

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Two Pages Online

Carol Dumaine, Global Reset Special Edition, SEED Magazine, 2010″On a Global Foresight Commons”, pp. 68-69. Reprinted with permission.

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Oct 7

Who’s Who in Public Intelligence: Carol Dumaine

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Ms. Carol Dumaine is one of a very small number of individuals who have sought to pursue what Gifford Pinchot calls “intrapreneurship,” but on a global scale.

She first came to international attention when she pioneered Global Futures Partnership, an analytic endeavor seeking to enhance outreach and cross-fertilization across varied communities of practice.

She received the following recognition from the emergent M4IS2 community in 2002:

Global Futures Partnership, Central Intelligence Agency
OSS ’02: 21st Century Emerging Leadership Award. Global Futures Partnership, Central Intelligence Agency. Under the leadership of Carol Dumaine with her extraordinary vision, the Global Futures Partnership has created strategic learning forums bringing the rich perspectives of the outside world into the classified environment in a manner never before attempted. This official but revolutionary endeavor nurtures an outside-in channel for integrating a diversity of perspectives. It is a vanguard toward a future in which the lines between national and global intelligence, and between governmental and nongovernmental intelligence, are blurred into extinction.

She is interested in the areas of “knowledge ecosystems,” “ecologies of innovation,” and “collective intelligence” for applicable models, practices and theories which may be useful to prototyping a new capacity for “strategic intelligence” in energy and environmental security.

Carol Dumaine is a graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and has a Master’s degree from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

On the left is her May 2009 presentation to the International Security Forum in Geneva, and on the right, a March 2009 presentation at the Institute for Environmental Security of the Brookings Institute.

Carol Dumaine Geneva May 2009

Carol Dumaine Geneva May 2009

Carol Dumaine, March 2009, Brookings

Carol Dumaine, March 2009, Brookings

 

See Also at Phi Beta Iota:

Reference: 2010 Global Foresight Commons

Search: “global futures partnership” 2010

2009 Dumain Geneva Common Security Uncommon Challenges

2009 Carol Dumaine: New Security Challenges

2006 HBK Carole Dumaine Global Futures Partnership “Are You Ready”

2004 New Frontiers in Intelligence Analysis (Global Futures Partnership and Gino Germani Center)

2002 Global Futures Partnership–Vision of Lasting Value

Reference: Global Futures Partnership “Are You Ready”

External Links of Note

Carol Dumaine – Energy and Environment in a 21st Century Security Framework

Gov 2.0 Summit 09: Carol Dumaine, “Rapid Fire: Setting the Stage” repaired 24Sep 2012

Plan To Aid National Security (2008)

Top Hits

See Also:

Congressman James Moran Honors Carol Dumaine

Journal: LEXIS-NEXIS OSINT Kiss to CIA/OSC

Monograph: The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy Getting Analysis Right

Reference: Italian Ministry of Defense Briefings

Reference: UnityNet — an M4IS2 Option

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

Virtual President Announces Coalition Cabinet

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Sep 16

Search: “global futures partnership” 2010

Thank you for this search.  We select and respond to searches for two reasons:

1.  80% of the knowledge is not published, the searches allow us to provide some form of response.

2.  We discover other cool stuff while checking the larger web, and that helps us learn.

Global Futures Partnership (GFP) is now and will forever be centered on Carol Dumaine, one of two CIA employees still standing that we think the world of–the other is Andy Shepard.  There are no doubt a handful of others that merit special regard, but they have been locked in the closet with socks in their mouths so they are unknown to us.

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Jan 28

Journal: LEXIS-NEXIS OSINT Kiss to CIA/OSC

 

Full Story Online

More Than Espionage: Open-source intelligence should be part of solution

 

Washington Times   January 27, 2010    Pg. B3

By Andrew M. Borene

Here’s some food for thought: White House policymakers and Congress can help develop an increasingly robust national intelligence capacity by investing new money in the pursuit of a centralized open-source intelligence (OSINT) infrastructure.

Phi Beta Iota: In 1992 it was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and The MITRE Corporation that destroyed the emergent Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) movement.  CIA refused to deal with OSINT unless everyone associated with it was a U.S. citizen with a SECRET clearance (we do not make this stuff up), and MITRE misled the US Government in such a way as to promote their Open Source Information System (OSIS) that ended up providing analysts mediocre high-side access to six open sources (LEXIS-NEXIS, Oxford Analytics, Jane’s Information Group, Predicast and two other non-memorable sources).  The US Marine Corps, which was the proponent for OSINT based on the lessons learned in creating the Marine Corps Intelligence Center (MCIC), argued for an outside the wire center of excellence that would have access to all sources in all languages (in part because the “experts” flogged by contracting firms may have been expert once, but are not “the” expert on any given topic for any given day–for that we prize European and Chinese and Latin American graduate students about to receive their PhD).

During his tenure as Director of the Community Open Source Program Office (COSPO), Dr. Joe Markowitz, the only person ever to actually understand OSINT within CIA, closely followed by Carol Dumaine, founder of the Global Futures Partership, tried four years in a row, with the support of Charlie Allen, then Deputy Director for Collection (DDCI/C), to get an OSINT program line established.  Four years in a row, Joan Dempsey, then Deputy Director for Community Management (DDCI/CM) refused.  The secret IC is incapable of creating an Open Source Agency (OSA) as called for by the 9-11 Commission, and any money it puts in that direction will be wasted unless the Simmons-Steele-Markowitz recommendations briefed to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are respected.

Dr. Markowitz is also the author of the OSINT portions of vital Defense Science Board reports such as Transitions to and from Hostilities, and is unique within the CIA alumni for understanding both the needs of defense and the possibilities of OSINT.  COSPO was an honest effort–CIA/OSC is not.

CIA and LEXIS-NEXIS still do not get it–they both want a monopoly on a discicpline they do not understand and cannot monopolize.  The US Government is a BENEFICIARY of OSINT, not its patron, and any endeavor that is not outside the wire, transparent, and under diplomatic and civil affairs auspices, is destined to fail, just as CIA/OSC has failed all these years, just as LEXIS-NEXIS, Oxford Analytica, and Jane’s Information Group have failed on substance all these years.    They profit from government ignorance, they do not profit from actually connecting the government to sources that are largely free, not online, and not in English.

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Jan 27

Graphic: President and Humanity

Forthcoming in Strategic Studies Institute Mongraph on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) approved for publication by CIA and DoD.  In the interim, can be seen at www.oss.net/HUMINT.

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Jan 10

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

COIN20 Trip Report

Paradise Found

The future of OSINT is M4IS2.

The future of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is Multinational, Multifunctional, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing & Sense-Making (M4IS2).

The following, subject to the approval of Executive and Congressional leadership, are suggested hueristics (rules of thumb):

Rule 1: All Open Source Information (OSIF) goes directly to the high side (multinational top secret) the instant it is received at any level by any civilian or military element responsive to global OSINT grid.  This includes all of the contextual agency and mission specific information from the civilian elements previously stove-piped or disgarded, not only within the US, but ultimately within all 90+ participating nations.

Rule 2: In return for Rule 1, the US IC agrees that the Department of State (and within DoD, Civil Affairs) is the proponent outside the wire, and the sharing of all OSIF originating outside the US IC is at the discretion of State/Civil Affairs without secret world caveat or constraint.  OSIF collected by US IC elements is NOT included in this warrant.

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Nov 25

Carol Dumaine: New Security Challenges

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Dumaine New Security Challenges 1 Oct 2009

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Oct 1

Monograph: The U.S. Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy Getting Analysis Right

Categories: Analysis,Monographs
Free Online

Free Online

This monograph by Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal, a PDF of 81 pages, is just out (September 2009) from the China Center of the Brookings Institute.  In its area of specific focus, getting analysis right, it is a solid B+, short of an A because it continues the unilateralist mind-set that eschews both full engagement with the other seven tribes of intelligence, and with multinational governments, corporations, and non-profit organizations that do not wish to share secrets but are willing to share substantive knowledge.

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Sep 16

Reference: Security in a world in Which ‘There is No More Normal’”

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PDF 29 Pages

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Mar 17

Review: Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis

TradecraftDisappointing, Some Value, October 22, 2008

Gregory F. Treverton

There are six (6) pages in this work that held my attention: pages 11-12 (Table 2.2 Analytic Concerns, by Frequency of Mention); page 14 (Figure 3.1, A Pyramid of Analytic Tasks); page 20 (Table 3.1, Wide Range of Analytical Tools and Skills Required); page 34 (Figure 5.1, Intelligence Analysis and Information Types), and page 35 (Table 5.1, Changing Tradecraft Characteristics). Print them off from the free PDF copy online (search for title).

My first review allotted two stars, on the second complete reading I decided that was a tad harsh because I *did* go through it twice, so I now raise it to three stars largely because pages 11-12 were interesting enough to warrant an hour of my time (see below). This work reinvents the wheel from 1986, 1988, 1992, etcetera, but the primary author is clearly ignorant of all that has happened before, and the senior author did not bother to bring him up to speed (I know Greg Treverton knows this stuff).

Among many other flaws, this light once over failed to do even the most cursory of either literature or unclassified agency publication (not even the party line rag, Studies in Intelligence). Any book on this topic that is clueless about Jack Davis and his collected memoranda on analytic tradecraft, or Diane Webb and her utterly brilliant definition of Computer Aided Tools for the Analysis of Science and Technology (CATALYST), is not worthy of being read by an all-source professional. I would also have expected Ruth Davis and Carol Dumaine to be mentioned here, but the lack of attribution is clearly a lack of awareness that I find very disturbing.

I looked over the bibliography carefully, and it confirmed my evaluation. This is another indication that RAND (a “think tank”) is getting very lazy and losing its analytic edge. In this day and age of online bibliography citation, the paucity of serious references in this work is troubling (I wax diplomatic).

Here are ten books–only one of mine (and all seven of mine are free online as well as at Amazon):

Informing Statecraft
Bombs, Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Intelligence and America’s Quest for Security
Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age
Early Warning: Using Competitive Intelligence to Anticipate Market Shifts, Control Risk, and Create Powerful Strategies
The Art and Science of Business Intelligence Analysis (Advances in Applied Business Strategy,)
Analysis Without Paralysis: 10 Tools to Make Better Strategic Decisions
Strategic and Competitive Analysis: Methods and Techniques for Analyzing Business Competition
Lost Promise
Still Broken: A Recruit’s Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, from Baghdad to the Pentagon
The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political–Citizen’s Action Handbook for Fighting Terrorism, Genocide, Disease, Toxic Bombs, & Corruption.

On the latter, look for “New Rules for the New Craft of Intelligence” that is free online as a separate document. Both Davis and Webb can be found online because I put them there in PDF form.

The one thing in this book that was useful, but badly presented, was the table of analyst concerns across nine issues that did not include tangible resources, multinational sense-making, or access to NSA OSINT.

Below is my “remix” of the table to put it into more useful form:

54% Quality of Intelligence
54% Tools of intelligence/analysis
43% Staffing
43% Intra-Community collaboration and data sharing
41% Collection Issues
38% Evaluation
32% Targeting Analysis
30% Value

Above are the categories with totals (first initial below connects to above). The top four validate the DNI’s priorities and clearly need work.

32% T Targeting Analysis is important
30% V Redefine intelligence
30% Q Analysis too captive to current
30% To Directed R&D for analytic technology needed
27% T Targeting needs prioritization
27% S Analyst training important and insufficient
22% V Uniqueness
22% E PDB problematic as metric
22% To “Tools” of intelligence analysis are poor
22% To “Tools” limit analysis and limited by culture

The line items above are for me very significant. We still do priority based collection rather than gap-driven collection, something I raised on the FIRCAP and with Rick Shackleford in 1992. Our analysts (most of them less than 5 years in service) are clearly concerned about both a misdirection of collection and of analysis, and a lack of tools–this 22 years after Diane Webb identified the 18 needed functionalities and the Advanced Information Processing and Analysis Steering Group (AIPASG) found over 20 different *compartmented* projects, all with their own sweetheart vendor, trying to create “the” all-source fusion workstation.

19% C S&T underused, needs understanding
16% E Critical and needs improvement
14% E Assess performance qualitatively
14% Q Quality of analysis is a concern
14% Q Intelligence focus too narrow
14% S Language, culture, regional are big weaknesses
11% A Leadership
11% L Must be improved
11% Q Problem centric vice regional
11% Q Global coverage is important
11% C Open source critical, need new sources
11% I Lack of leadership and critical mass impair IC-wide
11% I IC information technology infrastructure needed
11% I Non-traditional source agencies need more input
8% V Unclear goals prevail
8% T Targetting analysis needs attn+
8% C Collection strategies/methods outdated
8% S Concern over lack of staff or surge capability
8% S Intelligence Community-wide curriculum desireable
8% I Should NOT pursue virtual wired network
8% I Security is a concern for virtual and sharing
5% E Evaluation not critical
5% Q Depth versus breadth an issue
5% Q Greater client context needed
5% C Law enforcement has high potential
5% S Analytic corps is highly trained better than ever
5% S Career track needs building
5% I Stovepiping is a problem, need more X-community
5% I Should pursue virtual organization and wired network
3% V Newsworthy not intelligence
3% L Radical transformation needed
3% E Metrics are not needed
3% E Evaluation is negative
3% E Audits are difficult
3% Q Long term shortfalls overstated
3% Q Global coverage too difficult
3% T Targeting can be left to collectors
3% C All source materially lacking
3% C Need to guard against evidence addiction
3% C Need to take into account “feedback”
3% S Should train stovepipe analysts not IC analysts
3% S Language and cultural a strength

For the rest, not now, but three at the bottom trouble me: the analysts do not have the appreciation for feedback; they do not understand how lacking they are in sources; and they don’t know enough to realize that radical transformation is needed.

On balance, I found this book annoying, but two pages ultimately provocative.

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Oct 22