SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST
Max G. Manwaring, November 2004, Strategic Studies Institute
Phi Beta Iota: Every passing day reminds us that Dr. Col Max Manwaring has made so many extraordinary contributions to our strategic understanding across so many fronts, and yet his work does not appear to have been appreciated to the degree that we consider warranted. Below is one small portion of his teachings from this reference.
This monograph concludes with the idea that the complex realities of contemporary political-insurgency wars must be understood as holistic processes that rely on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion to achieve mutually agreed political-strategic ends. In this connection, at a minimum, three strategic-level imperatives are needed to begin to deal effectively with unconventional conflict situations. They are:
(1) civil-military and military-to-military dialogue regarding viable security and stability,
(2) fundamental education and understanding requirements, and
(3) the strategic application of U.S. military power.
The associated recommendations take us beyond doing “something” for something’s sake to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and implementation of the strategic ends, ways, and means that directly support the achievement of a political endgame.
Dr. Col Max Manwaring
Dr. Max G. Manwaring is a Professor of Military Strategy in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). He has held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research at the USAWC, and is a retired U.S. Army colonel. He has served in various civilian and military positions, including the U.S. Southern Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Dickinson College, and Memphis University. Dr. Manwaring is the author and coauthor of several articles, chapters, and books dealing with Latin American security affairs, political-military affairs, and insurgency and counterinsurgency. His most recent book is Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portent for the Future, University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. His most recent article is “Sovereignty under Siege: Gangs and Other Criminal Organizations in Central America and Mexico,” in Air & Space Power Journal (in Spanish), forthcoming. His most recent SSI monograph is A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil. Dr. Manwaring holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.
The Manwaring Trilogy
Review: The Search for Security–A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Review: Environmental Security and Global Stability–Problems and Responses
Review: Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series) (Hardcover)
2004 SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST
2003 Manwaring (US) War & Conflict: Six Generations
2002 Manwaring (US) Asymmetry, Conflict, and the Need to Achieve Both Vertical and Horizonal Integration
Graphic: Information Operations (IO) Eras
The future of OSINT is M4IS2.
The future of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is Multinational, Multifunctional, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing & Sense-Making (M4IS2).
The following, subject to the approval of Executive and Congressional leadership, are suggested hueristics (rules of thumb):
Rule 1: All Open Source Information (OSIF) goes directly to the high side (multinational top secret) the instant it is received at any level by any civilian or military element responsive to global OSINT grid. This includes all of the contextual agency and mission specific information from the civilian elements previously stove-piped or disgarded, not only within the US, but ultimately within all 90+ participating nations.
Rule 2: In return for Rule 1, the US IC agrees that the Department of State (and within DoD, Civil Affairs) is the proponent outside the wire, and the sharing of all OSIF originating outside the US IC is at the discretion of State/Civil Affairs without secret world caveat or constraint. OSIF collected by US IC elements is NOT included in this warrant.