Review: The Complexity of Modern Asymmetric Warfare

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Max Manwaring

5.0 out of 5 stars A Capstone Book — Still a Disconnect Between What We Know and What We Do, October 20, 2012

John Fishel opens the book with a valuable contextual overview that reminds us of the preceding volumes that Max has put together:
Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portents for the Future (International and Security Affairs)
Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in Uncomfortable Wars (International and Security Affairs Series, Vol. 6)

John is modest in not mentioning two very important works, certainly relevant here, that he and Max put together:
Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations (Small Wars and Insurgencies)
Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs)

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Oct 20

Reference: Max Manwaring on Strategy & Insurgency

Categories: Monographs
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SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST

Max G. Manwaring, November 2004, Strategic Studies Institute

Phi Beta Iota: Every passing day reminds us that Dr. Col Max Manwaring has made so many extraordinary contributions to our strategic understanding across so many fronts, and yet his work does not appear to have been appreciated to the degree that we consider warranted.  Below is one small portion of his teachings from this reference.

This monograph concludes with the idea that the complex realities of contemporary political-insurgency wars must be understood as holistic processes that rely on various civilian and military agencies and contingents working together in an integrated fashion to achieve mutually agreed political-strategic ends. In this connection, at a minimum, three strategic-level imperatives are needed to begin to deal effectively with unconventional conflict situations. They are:

(1) civil-military and military-to-military dialogue regarding viable security and stability,

(2) fundamental education and understanding requirements, and

(3) the strategic application of U.S. military power.

The associated  recommendations take us beyond doing “something” for something’s sake to the cooperative, holistic, and long-term planning and implementation of the strategic ends, ways, and means that directly support the achievement of a political endgame.

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Sep 12

Who’s Who in Peace Intelligence: Dr. Col Max Manwaring, US Army Strategic Studies Institute

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Dr. Col Max Manwaring

Dr. Max G. Manwaring is a Professor of Military Strategy in the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC). He has held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research at the USAWC, and is a retired U.S. Army colonel. He has served in various civilian and military positions, including the U.S. Southern Command, the Defense Intelligence Agency, Dickinson College, and Memphis University. Dr. Manwaring is the author and coauthor of several articles, chapters, and books dealing with Latin American security affairs, political-military affairs, and insurgency and counterinsurgency. His most recent book is Insurgency, Terrorism, and Crime: Shadows from the Past and Portent for the Future, University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. His most recent article is “Sovereignty under Siege: Gangs and Other Criminal Organizations in Central America and Mexico,” in Air & Space Power Journal (in Spanish), forthcoming. His most recent SSI monograph is A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil. Dr. Manwaring holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Illinois, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College.

The Manwaring Trilogy

Review: The Search for Security–A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

Review: Environmental Security and Global Stability–Problems and Responses

Review: Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series) (Hardcover)

Other Interventions

2004 SHADOWS OF THINGS PAST AND IMAGES OF THE FUTURE: LESSONS FOR THE INSURGENCIES IN OUR MIDST

2003 Manwaring (US) War & Conflict: Six Generations

2002 Manwaring (US) Asymmetry, Conflict, and the Need to Achieve Both Vertical and Horizonal Integration

Graphic: Information Operations (IO) Eras

Other Publications

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Jan 14

Search: The Future of OSINT [is M4IS2-Multinational]

COIN20 Trip Report

Paradise Found

The future of OSINT is M4IS2.

The future of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is Multinational, Multifunctional, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing & Sense-Making (M4IS2).

The following, subject to the approval of Executive and Congressional leadership, are suggested hueristics (rules of thumb):

Rule 1: All Open Source Information (OSIF) goes directly to the high side (multinational top secret) the instant it is received at any level by any civilian or military element responsive to global OSINT grid.  This includes all of the contextual agency and mission specific information from the civilian elements previously stove-piped or disgarded, not only within the US, but ultimately within all 90+ participating nations.

Rule 2: In return for Rule 1, the US IC agrees that the Department of State (and within DoD, Civil Affairs) is the proponent outside the wire, and the sharing of all OSIF originating outside the US IC is at the discretion of State/Civil Affairs without secret world caveat or constraint.  OSIF collected by US IC elements is NOT included in this warrant.

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Nov 25

Graphic: Information Operations (IO) Eras

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Information Operation (IO) Eras

Information Operation (IO) Eras

Col Dr. Max Manwaring defined the first six generations of warfare, Robert Steele converted those to information operaitons (IO) eras, and added the 7th era, which is easiy to achieve with leadership integrity, virtually impossible to achieve as long as any government persists in retaining legacy systems that are stovepipes within stovepipes surrounded by security and legal and personality strait-jackets from earlier eras and totally ignorant of modern possibilities.

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Aug 15

Threat Archives on Public Intelligence (1992-2006)

Categories: Threats

2004

NO

Threat Bjorgo Root Causes of Terrorism

2004

US

Threat Kaplan The Saudi Connection to Terrorism

2004

US

Threat Knapp Al Qaeda and the Mass Media (PSYOP Briefing)

2004

US

Threat Knapp Al Qaeda and the Mass Media (Reference)

2004

US

Threat Knapp Distortion in Islam and Jihad

2004

US

Threat Knapp Diversity in Islam

2006

US

Threat Daly Al Qaeda Against Saudi Oil

2006

US

Threat Johnson Battle of Algiers and Its Lessons

2006

US

Threat Seagraves Gold Warriors: New Epilogue, Further of US Theft of WWII Gold Loot

2006

US

Threat Seagraves Gold Warriors New Chapter Seventeen

2006

US

Threat Steele Who Is to Blamce?  The Vice President and Us

2006

US

Threat Stern Al Qaeda Approach to US Muslims

2006

UK

Threat Story Crunch Time for CIA, Banks, and Related Thieves of $742 Trillion

2005

US

Threat Ellis Scenarios for Next Generation Crises in Latin America

2005

US

Threat GAO GAO Report: US Not Addressing Islamic Fundamentalism

2005

US

Threat OSS Somalia Piracy Quick Report

2005

US

Threat OSS Report on Remote Detonation of Improvised Explosive Devices

2005

US

Threat OSS PRC Trade in Latin America

2005

US

Threat Ray & Gross The Perfect Storm

2005

US

Threat Steele Worksheet for Book Review on Crossing the Rubicon

2005

US

Threat Steele Mother Nature as Terrorist

2005

US

Threat Steele 9-11: Who’s To Blame?  One Man’s Opinion

2005

US

Threat Thompson Is the Terrorism Threat Over-Rated?

2004

US

Threat Daly Globalization & National Defense (Ecological Economics)

2004

US

Threat Louisiana Pre-Hurricane Katrina Study and Conclusions

2004

US

Threat Palmer The Real Axis of Evil: 44 Dictators

2004

US

Threat Peters Early Warning of Disease From Pattern Analysis

2004

US

Threat Seagrave Transcript of Video on Stolen Gold Held by US Treasury & Citi-Bank

2004

US

Threat Vlahos Attachment to the Muslim Renovatio Memorandum

2004

US

Threat Vlahos The Muslim Renovatio and U.S. Strategy

2004

US

Threat Vlahos The Muslims Are Coming

2004

US

Threat Vlahos Insurgency Within Islam

2003

US

Threat Danzip Countering Traumatic Attacks

2003

PRC

Threat OSS PRC Treaty & Trade Penetration of Latin America

2002

US

Threat Emerson & Steele American Jihad Map

2002

US

Threat Steele ACFR, 19 Cities: 9-11, U.S. Intelligence, & the Real World

2000

US

Threat Steele Georgetown/AWC: Non-Traditional Threats

1998

US

Threat Steele TAKEDOWN: Targets, Tools, & Technocracy

1994

US

Threat Steele 6th National Threat Symposium: New Directions in Information Sharing

2005

NGO

Threat NGO Changing Face of Global Violence

2005

NGO

Threat NGO Human Security Audit

2004

US

Threat Pelton Robert Young Pelton on Dangerous World

2004

US

Threat Steele Three Book Review Relevant to Global War on Terror (GWOT)

2003

US

Threat Copeland Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism

2003

US

Threat Manwaring Street Gangs: New Urban Insurgency

2003

US

Threat Manwaring War & Conflict: Six Generations

2003

US

Threat Pelton Summary of Presentation on World’s Most Dangerous Places

2002

US

Threat Betts The Next Intelligence Failure: The Limits of Prevention

2002

NL

Threat Jongman World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001-2002

2002

US

Threat Wheaton Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: A Model

2002

US

Threat Wheaton Virtual Afghanistan: Modeling a Transition from Authoritarian Rule

2001

US

Threat Godson Governments and Gangs

2001

US

Threat Heidenrich Early Warning & Complex Monitoring of Ethnic Genocide (Slides)

2001

US

Threat Heidenrich Early Warning & Complex Monitoring of Ethnic Genocide (Text)

1998

US

Threat Transnational Enemies: Threats Without Names

1998

US

Threat Glaebus Metaphors & Modern Threats: Biological, Computer, Cognitive Viruses

1997

US

Threat Fialka War by Other Means: Economic Espionage In (Against) America

1997

US

Threat Schwartau Information Warfare: The Weapons of the Information Age

1997

US

Threat Tenney Cyber-Law and Cyber-Crime: Spamming Methods and Costs

1996

US

Threat Keuhl School of Information Warfare Threat and Strategy: Shifting Paradigms

1996

US

Threat O’Malley Countering the Business Intelligence Threat

1996

US

Threat Strassmann U.S. Knowledge Assets: The Choice Target for Information Crime

1996

US

Threat Winkler Electronic Industrial Espionage: Defining Ground Zero

1994

US

Threat Whitney-Smith Refugees: Weapon of the Post Cold War World–Counter Offensive: IW
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Jul 18

Review: Uncomfortable Wars Revisited (International and Security Affairs Series) (Hardcover)

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5.0 out of 5 stars Top Ten Book. Moral Legitimacy, Inter-Agency Unity of Effortt, Deep Language & Cultural Skills,

March 17, 2006
John T. Fishel
Max Manwaring is one of my heroes, and it upsets me to see the publisher do such a lousy job of posting information about this book, which is a gem. This book was a classic when it was first published, and it is even better now that it has been updated and the SWORD model slightly refined. Along with The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century and Max’s other edited work, which I cannot find on Amazon, “Environmental Security & Global Security,” this book is about all any professional needs for a good clear appreciation of how to address low intensity conflicts, complex emergencies, and operations other than war.

The authors understand what Will and Ariel Durant emphasized in their summative The Lessons of History when they said that morality is a strategic value. The heart of this book is about the non-negotiable value of moral legitimacy to govern as the precursor to addressing root problems and preventing terrorism and instability. Winning uncomfortable wars is an IO/psychological and sociological challenge, but you cannot win them, regardless of how much might, money, or message you put on target, if you are not moral in the first place (and if your supported government is not moral).

The other two core messages in this book focus on the urgency of unity of effort across all agencies and the coalition, and the desperate need for LONG-TERM operations with LONG-TERM funding and LONG-TERM commitments from the leaderships of the nations as well as the United Nations and other NGOs. The authors are damning of both the US Congress and the UN for failing to be serious about budgeting for long-term stabilization and reconstruction operations.

The SWORD model has seven parts: unity of effort; legitimacy of the coalition and the supported government; interdiction of support to the belligerents; effective supporting actions by the coalition; military actions by the coalition; interactions between the coalition and the belligerents; and finally, actions tailored to ending the conflict.

Ambassador Corr could easily be credited with being the third author. His forward provides a sweeping review of history while his conclusion emphasizes that we cannot win without first having “a deep understanding of the cultures and languages…”

A few case studies round out the book. Colombia, where my mother was born, has long been one of Max’s special interests. His identification of the three wars (narcos, insurgents, and paramilitaries) reminds me of Tony Zinni’s elegant distinctions among the six Viet-Nam wars a) Swamp War, b) Paddy War, c) Jungle War, d) Plains War, e) Saigon War, and f) DMZ War.

Max is far more polite and diplomatic than I am, but his message is clear: US policy is in la-la land when it comes to crop eradication. On pages 197-198 he points out that farmers make four times more from narcotics than from the next available legal crop, and that they are trapped in circumstances where even if they had a profitable legal crop, there is no credit, there are no roads, there is no market, there is no security, for them to evolve legally. Credit, roads, market, security–for the LONG TERM.

Another book that really drives home the ineptitude of our short-term interventions is the one by William Shawcross, Deliver Us from Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict Two other nuanced books I recommend with this one are Robert McNamara and James Blight’s Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century and Jonathan Schell’s The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People.

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Mar 17

2003 Manwaring (US) War & Conflict: Six Generations

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Max Manwaring

Max Manwaring

Col Dr. Max Manwaring is one of America’s greatest scholar-warriors and especially valuable to all of us for his understanding of gangs and other asymmetric froms of organization that are vastly more adatable, imaginative, and resources than any bureaucracy.

He has been among a handful of patriotic souls speaking truth to power about the urgency of getting a grip on emerging threats that are non-state in nature.  Below is his presentation of the six generations of warfare–on a good day the US is lucky to get past fourth generation warfare, and completely unsuited–not trained, equipped, or organized–for generations five through seven (we added the seventh, see Graphics).

Max Manwaring

Max Manwaring

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Dec 19

Review: The Search for Security–A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century

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5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant, Coherent, Holistic, and Above All, Sane,

July 4, 2003
Max G. Manwaring
This book is a gem, and it is worth every penny, but it is a pity that it has not been priced for mass market because every U.S. citizen would benefit from reading this superb collection of chapters focused on how to keep America both safe and prosperous in a volatile world of super-empowered angry men, ethnic criminal gangs, mass migrations, epidemic disease, and water scarcity.President David Boren of the University of Oklahoma, himself a former Senator and former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, provides a non-partisan foreword that clearly indicts both Democrats and Republicans for what he calls a “zig-zag” foreign policy that is guided by TV images and weekly polls, rather than any coherent and calculated evaluation of ends, ways, and means.

Divided into three parts, the book first addresses the Global Security Environment (2 chapters), then discusses elements of a grand or total strategy (5 chapters), and concludes with a prescription (2 chapters). Every chapter is good.

Chapter 1 by Richard Millet does an outstanding job of discussing the global security environment in terms that make it crystal clear that the highest probability threats are non-traditional threats, generally involving non-state actors in a failed state environment. These are not threats that can be addressed by a heavy metal military that is not trained, equipped, nor organized for humanitarian or constabulary operations. Among his most trenchant observations: America can not succeed when the local elites (e.g. Colombia) are not willing to pay the price for internal justice and stability; sometimes the costs of success can exceed the costs of failure (Afghanistan?); what America lacks today is any criteria by which to determine when to attempt coalition building and when to go it alone; the real threat is not any single government or non-state organization, but the millions of daily decisions (e.g. to buy cocaine or smuggle medicine) that incentivise crime and endless conflict.

Chapter 2 by Robert Dorff dissects existing U.S. national security “strategy” and shows clearly, in a non-partisan manner, that the U.S. does not have a coherent inter-agency capability for agreeing on ends, ways, or means. He calls what we have now–both from the past under Clinton and in the present under Bush, “adhocery” and he makes the compelling point that our failure to have a coherent forward-looking strategy is costing the U.S. taxpayer both money and results.

Chapters 3-7 are each little gems. In Chapter 3 Max Manwaring suggests that our existing assumptions about geopolitics and military power are obsolete, and we are in great danger if Americans cannot change their way of thinking about national security issues. He suggests five remedies, the most important of which is the establishment of a coherent inter-agency planning and operational control process for leveraging all sources of national power–political, diplomatic, economic, military, and informational–simultaneously and in balance. In Chapter 4 Edwin Corr and Max Manwaring offer a fine discourse on why legitimate governance around the world must be “the” end that we seek as a means of assuring American security and prosperity in the face of globalization. Chapter 5 by Leif Rosenberger addresses the economic threats inherent in globalization, including free flows of capital, concluding that fixed exchange rates divorce countries from reality, and that the US must sponsor a global early warning system dedicated to the financial arena. Chapter 5 by Dennis Rempe is good but too short. He clearly identifies information power as being the equal of diplomacy, economics, and military power, going so far as to suggest an “International Information Agency” that could eventually become a public good as well as an objective arbiter of “ground truth.” I like this idea, in part because it is consistent with the ideas I set forth in NEW CRAFT, to wit that we need to migrate from secret intelligence intended for Presidents (who then manipulate that intelligence and lie to their people) toward public intelligence that can be discussed and understood by the people–this makes for sounder decisions. Chapter 7, again by Edwin Corr and Max Manwaring, discusses deterrence in terms of culture, motive, and effect–they are especially good in pointing out that traditional deterrence is irrelevant with suicidal martyrs, and that the best deterrence consists of the education of domestic publics about the realities of the post-Cold War world.

The book concludes with 2 chapters, the first by Edwin Corr and Max Manwaring, who discuss how values (education, income, civic virtue) must be the foundation of the American security strategy. They then translate this into some specific “objectives” for overseas investments and influences by the U.S., and they conclude that the ultimate investment must be in better educating both domestic and international audiences. They recommend the legitimacy of all governments as a global objective; End-State Planning (ESP) as the way to get there; and a new focus on holistic and long-term programs rather than “adhocery” as the best way to manage scarce means. One can only speculate how differently Afghanistan and Iraq (and Haiti, now discarded for a decade) might have turned out if the US had rolled in with a Marshall Plan or Berlin Airlift equivalent the minute organized hostilities ceased. Robert Dorff closes the book by pointing out that state failure is not the root cause, but rather the symptom, and that the U.S. must intervene before a state fails, not after.

I recommend this book, together with Colin Gray’s “Modern Strategy” as essential reading for any national security professional. The publishers should consider issuing a more affordable paperback (books cost a penny a page to produce, perhaps a penny a page to market, so anything over $5 on this book is pure profit). This is a book, like Harry Summers on strategy, that should be available for $15 in paperback–if it were, I would buy 200 for my next conference.

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Jul 4

Review: Environmental Security and Global Stability–Problems and Responses

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5.0 out of 5 stars

May be “Ref A” for New National Security Focus,

May 24, 2003
Dr. Col Max Manwaring
Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II
This book is very original and very helpful in exploring an area of national security conceptualization and doctrine that has been long neglected–that of the relationship between environmental security and stability, and all the bad things that happen when this is lost–ultimately causing poverty, mass migrations, disease, crime, and war.The contributing editor, Dr. Max Manwaring (Col USA Ret) uses an interview with General Anthony Zinni, then Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command, to examine key issues such as the desperate need for inter-agency coordination and information sharing, the looming catastrophic problems with rain forests, seabed resources, and inland water scarcity, ending with the urgent need for a national security “game plan” for dealing with this non-traditional threat over time and across all nations including the 32 failed states where many of the problems will not be addressed without outside intervention.

All eight of the chapters, the last being a conclusion by the contributing editor, make provocative, documented cases for the urgency of this non-traditional threat. Throughout the book it is clear that the US Department of Defense has some extremely bright uniformed and retired (teaching) officers who are thinking great thoughts, and it is equally clear that they are not being listened to. This book is probably ten years ahead of its time, and it will be ten years before this book is read and understood by a Secretary of Defense (or ten years before someone reading the book today will be eligible for that position).

I recommend this book be read together with Andrew Price-Smith’s book on “The Health of Nations” (on re-emerging infectuous diseases), Laurie Garrett’s book “Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health”, Marq de Villiers’ book “WATER: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource”, David Helvarg’s “BLUE FRONTIER: Saving America’s Living Seas,” and Brian Czech’s “Shoveling Fuel for a Runaway Train” (on errant economists and shameful spenders).

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May 24